The UN Security Council fails at least once between September 22 and 28, 2026 due to a veto (Russia, China, or USA) on a resolution regarding Iran, the Middle East, or Ukraine (confirmed by UN press release or Reuters by September 29, 2026)
Miss
✦ AI-generated prediction
Published on 21. September 2026
·
Predicted for 28. September 2026
·
Based on: Ongoing Event
The UN General Assembly holds its High-Level Week September 22–27, 2026; the UN Security Council meets regularly in parallel. With three active major conflicts (Iran War since February 28, 2026, Ukraine, Gaza), at least one UNSC session and draft resolution per week is the norm. Historically Russia exercises a UNSC veto every 3–4 weeks on average; China vetoes less often but often in tandem. In weeks coinciding with UNGA High-Level Segment and active war theaters, veto frequency increases. No Polymarket market; own calibration based on historical veto frequency.
Data basis for this prediction
- Al Jazeera: Iran War Day 200+ updates; UNSC activity September 2026
- UN.org UNGA 81: Hochrangige Woche 22.–27. September 2026
- Global Security: Iran War OPREP Day 203 (19.09.2026) – diplomatische Lage
- Reuters: Russia/China UNSC veto tracker 2024–2026
Verdict: Miss
Das einzige UNSC-Veto im September 2026 zum Thema Iran (Russland + China gegen US-Resolution zur Verlängerung des Expertenausschusses für Iran-Sanktionen) fand am 17. September 2026 statt – fünf Tage vor dem geforderten Fenster 22.–28. September. In der UNGA-Hochwoche (22.–27. Sept.) gab es am 23. September zwar eine hochrangige Ukraine-Sitzung, aber keinen Abstimmungsversuch mit Veto. Quellen: Reuters/EuroNews 18. Sept. 2026 (https://www.euronews.com/2026/09/18/russia-and-china-veto-us-backed-resolution-to-monitor-iran-nuclear-sanctions), Security Council Report Oktober-Status-Update (https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-10/status-update-since-our-september-forecast-8.php), Wikipedia-Vetoliste (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_vetoed_United_Nations_Security_Council_resolutions). Die Grundlogik der Vorhersage war korrekt (Veto fand statt), aber das präzise Zeitfenster wurde knapp verfehlt.
🏛️ Politics
✦ AI
Democrats won both chambers historically at the November 3, 2026 midterms (Senate 54:44, House 258 seats — largest majority since 1993). Trump's disapproval rating stands at 62% (FiveThirtyEight, Nov 2026). Based on documented behavioral pattern: after the 2020 presidential election, Trump posted voter fraud claims within 48 hours; after the 2022 midterms, challenges followed within a week. Metaculus community places >70% probability on public contesting after major GOP losses. A public statement via Truth Social, press release, or confirmed media interview by November 15, 2026 counts as verification (Reuters or AP).
🏛️ Politics
✦ AI
Ukrainian, US, and Russian negotiators convene November 10–11 in Abu Dhabi. Russia conducted large-scale long-range strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure and logistics hubs on November 3–4; Ukraine responded with drone strikes on the Ryazan refinery. Positions on territory and security guarantees remain far apart. No Polymarket or Kalshi market covers this specific event; historical base rate for failure of comparable trilateral talks: >80%.
🏛️ Politics
✦ AI
Spain holds a general election on 29 November 2026. Polymarket prices Feijóo as next PM at 85%, Kalshi at 82% — both serve as anchors. A separate Polymarket market gives PP+Vox a 92% probability of a joint majority (>176/350 seats). Current polls (Sondaxe) show PP at 29.2% narrowly ahead of PSOE (26.9%); Vox is tracking slightly higher. Feijóo failed to form a government in 2023, but market odds reflect the lesson learned: PP+Vox is now seen as stable enough. No deviation from market anchor warranted.