Bündnis 90/Die Grünen fail to clear the 5% threshold at the Saxony-Anhalt state election (September 6, 2026) and do not enter the state parliament (confirmed by state returning officer or tagesschau.de by September 7, 2026)
Miss
✦ AI-generated prediction
Published on 3. September 2026
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Predicted for 6. September 2026
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Based on: Statistical Pattern
The Greens are structurally weak in East Germany. In the 2021 Saxony-Anhalt election they barely cleared 5.9%. Since then, they lost support sharply: Thuringia 2024: 3.2% (eliminated), Brandenburg 2024: 4.1% (eliminated), federal 2025 election in eastern constituencies well below 5%. Current polls for Saxony-Anhalt consistently show the Greens below 4%. No Polymarket contract; structural analogy to Thuringia/Brandenburg supports high probability.
Data basis for this prediction
- Thüringen-Wahl Oktober 2024: Grüne 3,2 % — an Sperrklausel gescheitert (Landeswahlleiter TH)
- Brandenburg-Wahl September 2024: Grüne 4,1 % — an Sperrklausel gescheitert (Landeswahlleiter BB)
- Sachsen-Anhalt 2021: Grüne 5,9 % — historischer Vergleichswert (Landeswahlleiter SA)
Verdict: Miss
Die Vorhersage ist klar falsch eingetreten. Die Grünen erzielten bei der Sachsen-Anhalt Landtagswahl am 6. September 2026 laut wahlrecht.de und bestätigt durch Al Jazeera/Wikipedia ca. 8,93 % der Zweitstimmen – damit überwanden sie die 5%-Sperrklausel komfortabel und zogen mit 5 Sitzen in den Magdeburger Landtag ein. Das Ergebnis war sogar besser als 2021 (5,9 %). Die Analogie zu Thüringen (3,2 %) und Brandenburg (4,1 %) ging nicht auf: In Sachsen-Anhalt profitierten die Grünen offenbar von einer anderen Wählerstruktur oder einer Mobilisierung gegen die dominante AfD (44,2 %), die anders verlief als erwartet. Quellen: wahlrecht.de (Landtagswahl Sachsen-Anhalt 2026), Al Jazeera (06.09.2026), Wikipedia (2026 Saxony-Anhalt state election).
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